Emotional Regimes of the Pandemic

First publi­shed May 8, 2025 in Cas­san­dra Voices

This Mortal Coil

The Covid pan­de­mic brought a public health emer­gen­cy, poli­ti­cal and legal chal­lenges, intense media cove­rage, social divi­sions, and intense debates among scien­tists. Yet, in public com­men­ta­ries, atten­tion fell almost exclu­si­ve­ly on a single cause of suf­fe­ring : the virus itself.

This fra­ming of the cri­sis contri­bu­ted to an atmos­phere of extreme dan­ger, a sense that disease and death lur­ked around eve­ry street cor­ner. Public mes­sa­ging, media reports and dai­ly sta­tis­tics rein­for­ced the idea of omni­present risk. News cycles focu­sed relent­less­ly on case num­bers, hos­pi­ta­li­za­tions and fata­li­ties, making the threat feel imme­diate and inescapable.

Five years on, we can col­late how the pan­de­mic spar­ked a surge of research across many fields : medi­cine, public health, eco­no­mics, edu­ca­tion, and socio­lo­gy all respon­ded. This burst of aca­de­mic acti­vi­ty was not, howe­ver, spread even­ly. Biblio­me­tric stu­dies show that, at first, research focu­sed main­ly on cli­ni­cal medi­cine, immu­no­lo­gy, bio­lo­gy, gene­tics, and phar­ma­co­lo­gy ; the social sciences, psy­chia­try, and eco­no­mics recei­ved less atten­tion (Funa­da et al., 2023). Within the social sciences, ear­ly research loo­ked at well­being, the plight of heal­th­care wor­kers, vac­cines, and inequa­li­ties. Emo­tions were also stu­died, but far less often, ran­king only as the twen­ty-fourth most com­mon key­word in publi­shed papers (Ham­dan & Alsu­qaih, 2024).

Never­the­less, a clo­ser look at emo­tion-rela­ted research reveals a pro­ble­ma­tic focus. Most of these stu­dies exa­mine men­tal health issues and depres­sion, fatigue, sleep, fear, anxie­ty, coping stra­te­gies, resi­lience, and atti­tudes toward vac­cines. They treat emo­tions as indi­vi­dual reac­tions to a threa­te­ning situa­tion, main­ly, the risk of ill­ness or death. From this almost exclu­sive pers­pec­tive, emo­tions are consi­de­red as dis­rup­tions to psy­cho­lo­gi­cal balance, res­ponses to a bio­lo­gi­cal dan­ger sepa­rate from socie­ty or culture. They are pri­vate expe­riences, signs of men­tal strain when facing mor­ta­li­ty. Fear, grief, and anxie­ty are vie­wed as symp­toms of dan­ger and of risk, high­ligh­ting the per­so­nal impact of living through a threa­te­ning time.

Moving Beyond Reaction : Constructing the Emotional Field

This fra­ming of emo­tions over­looks a cru­cial point : emo­tions are not sim­ply auto­ma­tic, hard-wired bio­lo­gi­cal res­ponses to exter­nal situa­tions or threats. Rather, they are often acti­ve­ly pro­du­ced and sha­ped within par­ti­cu­lar moral, cultu­ral, and poli­ti­cal fra­me­works. How people come to fear, endure, or wor­ry is conti­nual­ly influen­ced by the signals and expec­ta­tions set by public dis­course, media nar­ra­tives, ins­ti­tu­tio­nal prac­tices and pre­vai­ling social norms.

The news media do obvious­ly more than report mere facts ; they select, empha­size, and dra­ma­tize cer­tain aspects of events, contri­bu­ting and even construc­ting the emo­tio­nal cli­mate of cri­sis accor­ding to pre­con­cei­ved judg­ments. Hence, the emo­tio­nal atmos­phere of the pan­de­mic, mar­ked by vigi­lance, anxie­ty, and col­lec­tive ten­sion, was not just a conse­quence of the virus, but the result of ongoing pro­cesses that sha­ped how people unders­tood and respon­ded to the unfol­ding situation.

‘Be a hero, wear a mask’

Seve­ral notable examples illus­trate how govern­ments and media employed rhe­to­ri­cal and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal tech­niques to shape public emotions.

In the UK, the slo­gan “Stay Home, Pro­tect the NHS, Save Lives” became one of the most wide­ly dis­se­mi­na­ted and emo­tio­nal­ly char­ged mes­sages of the Covid-19 pan­de­mic. Desi­gned to evoke both com­mu­nal duty and exis­ten­tial fear, it mobi­li­sed public sen­ti­ment around the act of staying at home, not sim­ply as a health mea­sure, but as a moral obli­ga­tion to shield others, par­ti­cu­lar­ly front­line heal­th­care wor­kers. Ubi­qui­tous across tele­vi­sion, news­pa­pers, and social media, the slo­gan fos­te­red an emo­tio­nal cli­mate of col­lec­tive res­pon­si­bi­li­ty and latent anxie­ty about overw­hel­ming the natio­nal health system.

Rhe­to­ri­cal­ly, the slo­gan is stri­king : its sim­pli­ci­ty, repe­ti­tion, and rhyth­mic cadence ren­der it both memo­rable and per­sua­sive. It appeals simul­ta­neous­ly to natio­nal soli­da­ri­ty, civic duty, and the highest ethi­cal impe­ra­tive, saving lives, thus acti­va­ting a com­plex affec­tive mix of fear, guilt, and altruism.

This emo­tio­nal construct was nei­ther acci­den­tal nor inci­den­tal. A report by the UK’s Scien­ti­fic Advi­so­ry Group for Emer­gen­cies, dated 22 March 2020 and tit­led “Options for Increa­sing Adhe­rence to Social Dis­tan­cing Mea­sures” (SPI‑B, 2020), expli­cit­ly recom­men­ded the use of emo­tio­nal­ly char­ged mes­sa­ging. It advi­sed that “the per­cei­ved level of per­so­nal threat needs to be increa­sed among those who are com­placent, using hard-hit­ting emo­tio­nal mes­sa­ging,” and fur­ther empha­si­zed the need to frame com­pliance as a duty to pro­tect others. Public mes­sa­ging was a deli­be­rate ins­tru­ment of affec­tive governance.

In France, the famous “Nous sommes en guerre”, “we are at war” slo­gan, pro­noun­ced by French Pre­sident Emma­nuel Macron recrui­ted the French citi­zens for “gene­ral mobi­li­sa­tion” against an “ene­my […] invi­sible and elu­sive”. This phrase, repea­ted six times during a single tele­vi­sed address, ancho­red the pan­de­mic within a war­time ima­gi­na­ry, fra­ming the virus as an invi­sible ene­my and the French popu­la­tion as com­ba­tants in a natio­nal struggle (Lema­rié, A., & Pie­tra­lun­ga, C. 2020).

The affec­tive envi­ron­ment in France was thus sha­ped around sacri­fice and mobi­li­sa­tion. Staying at home became not mere­ly a health direc­tive, but an act of natio­nal resis­tance, evo­king allu­sive memo­ries of the World War II. This rhe­to­ri­cal stra­te­gy, dee­ply embed­ded in French repu­bli­can tra­di­tions of uni­ty and state autho­ri­ty, reac­ti­va­ted sym­bo­lic reper­toires asso­cia­ted with past natio­nal emergencies.

Per­haps the most dis­quie­ting illus­tra­tion of plan­ned dis­ci­pli­na­ry and emo­tio­nal control during the Covid-19 cri­sis in Europe was to be found in a lea­ked stra­te­gy docu­ment from Germany’s Fede­ral Minis­try of the Inter­ior. Wide­ly refer­red to (iro­ni­cal­ly yet revea­lin­gly) as the “panic paper”, this inter­nal memo­ran­dum, draf­ted in March 2020, exposes the deli­be­rate mobi­li­sa­tion of fear and ter­ror as legi­ti­mate poli­ti­cal tools. The paper expli­cit­ly recom­mends heigh­te­ning the population’s sense of threat to ensure com­pliance with lock­down mea­sures, even pro­po­sing emo­tio­nal­ly mani­pu­la­tive nar­ra­tives tar­ge­ted at children.

The document’s authors do not hesi­tate to make emo­tio­nal­ly mani­pu­la­tive claims, unan­cho­red to any scien­ti­fic or empi­ri­cal evi­dence. One of the more dis­tur­bing pas­sages reads : “Chil­dren will easi­ly become infec­ted, even with res­tric­tions on lea­ving the house […] If they then infect their parents, and one of them dies in ago­ny at home, they will feel guil­ty because, for example, they for­got to wash their hands after playing. It is the most ter­rible thing a child can ever expe­rience.” (Bun­des­pa­pier, 2020)

Under the guise of public health stra­te­gy, the experts thus sug­gest that the state should conjure worst-case sce­na­rios to shock citi­zens into obe­dience. This wea­po­ni­sa­tion of fear, par­ti­cu­lar­ly the psy­cho­lo­gi­cal tar­ge­ting of chil­dren, marks a dis­con­cer­ting thre­shold where public com­mu­ni­ca­tion slips into psy­cho­lo­gi­cal coer­cion. It repre­sents a cal­cu­la­ted use of ter­ror to engi­neer behaviour.

Sur­pri­sin­gly enough, this nar­ra­tive was not limi­ted to govern­ments or the media. Even pro­minent intel­lec­tuals such as Jür­gen Haber­mas, one of the lea­ding voices in the theo­ry of deli­be­ra­tive demo­cra­cy, per­cei­ved demo­cra­cy as having ground to a halt. Under the threat to “the life and health of mem­bers of the spe­cies Homo sapiens across the globe,” Haber­mas decla­red in 2021, in stri­kin­gly dra­ma­tic terms, that huma­ni­ty found itself in a tru­ly exis­ting Hob­be­sian state of nature, enga­ged in a meta­phy­si­cal and bio­lo­gi­cal war for the sur­vi­val of the spe­cies. In such a situa­tion, Haber­mas thought, the “legal­ly man­da­ted acts of soli­da­ri­ty” requi­red by the autho­ri­ty of the state must over­ride indi­vi­dual rights and liber­ties without excep­tion (Haber­mas, 2021). In other words, the recourse to a tem­po­ra­ry dic­ta­tor­ship is defen­ded as a legi­ti­mate means of safe­guar­ding demo­cra­cy itself.

Reframing the emotional pandemic

Such tac­tics reflect a bio­po­li­ti­cal logic in which emo­tions are ins­tru­men­ta­li­sed, mani­pu­la­ted, and wea­po­ni­sed in the name of secu­ri­ty. As the Ame­ri­can his­to­rian William Reddy’s notion of ‘emo­tio­nal regimes’ reminds us, the state not only regu­lates action but pres­cribes fee­ling. What the “panic paper” reveals is an attempt to ins­ti­tu­tio­na­lise anxie­ty and guilt as tools of gover­nance, under­mi­ning demo­cra­tic trust and ethi­cal res­pon­si­bi­li­ty in the process.

Insights from the his­to­ry and anthro­po­lo­gy of emo­tions, par­ti­cu­lar­ly the work of Bar­ba­ra Rosen­wein and William Red­dy, invite us to rethink this fra­ming of emo­tions. Rosenwein’s concept of ‘emo­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ties’ (2006) high­lights how emo­tions are sha­ped, valued, and regu­la­ted within par­ti­cu­lar social groups, each with their own norms and expres­sive codes. From this stand­point, emo­tions during the pan­de­mic can­not be redu­ced to indi­vi­dual reac­tions but must be unders­tood as pat­ter­ned and nor­ma­tive, reflec­ting the affec­tive eco­no­mies of dis­tinct com­mu­ni­ties : com­mu­ni­ties of fear, of denial, of moral indi­gna­tion, or of solidarity.

Simi­lar­ly, Reddy’s theo­ry of ‘emo­tives’ (2001) empha­sises the per­for­ma­tive and world-sha­ping nature of emo­tio­nal expres­sion. Emo­tions are not mere­ly res­ponses to a given rea­li­ty ; they par­ti­ci­pate in sha­ping that rea­li­ty by enac­ting or chal­len­ging domi­nant scripts.

Sha­ping the emo­tio­nal land­scape of the pan­de­mic through these theo­re­ti­cal lenses allows us to move beyond the medi­cal para­digm and to inter­ro­gate the nor­ma­tive, poli­ti­cal, and cultu­ral scripts that gover­ned which emo­tions were consi­de­red legi­ti­mate, intel­li­gible, or deviant. It also opens the way to ana­lyse how emo­tions were mobi­li­sed to sus­tain or contest public poli­cies, shape col­lec­tive iden­ti­ties, and arti­cu­late forms of belon­ging or exclusion.

How to do emotions with words

Although tra­di­tio­nal theo­ries of public rela­tions and pro­pa­gan­da from Ber­nays and Ador­no to Ellul have long empha­si­zed the cen­tral role of emo­tions in sha­ping public opi­nion, the Ame­ri­can his­to­rian William Red­dy offers a stri­kin­gly ori­gi­nal lens through which to exa­mine how speech, when ins­tru­men­ta­li­sed, not only conveys but acti­ve­ly pro­duces emo­tio­nal states. The fra­me­work he deve­lo­ped in his book The Navi­ga­tion of Fee­ling (2001) allows us to recon­si­der emo­tio­nal expres­sion not as a by-pro­duct of per­sua­sion, but as a form of action in its own right.

The expres­sions and for­mu­lae he calls “emo­tives” work at the same time as expres­sions and speech-acts that do not mere­ly reflect a fee­ling but also act upon the fee­lings expressed.

Let us consi­der one of the slo­gans wide­ly used in the UK during Covid : “Can you look them in the eyes and tell them you’re hel­ping by staying at home?” The for­mu­la obvious­ly expresses sen­ti­ments of moral urgen­cy, it pur­veys a sense of guilt, and it evokes a fee­ling of sha­red suf­fe­ring. By mobi­li­sing emo­tio­nal res­ponses in its audience, the mes­sage not only seeks com­pliance but also helps pro­duce an ima­gi­ned com­mu­ni­ty of res­pon­si­bi­li­ty, what Bene­dict Ander­son might des­cribe as a poli­ti­cal­ly construc­ted sense of belon­ging for­ged through sha­red affect and nar­ra­tive. “Not staying at home” not only becomes a moral­ly sha­me­ful act, but it also trans­forms those who do not abide by the rules into anti­so­cial or even dan­ge­rous outsiders.

As such, the for­mu­la is not sim­ply des­crip­tive (“you are har­ming people”), nor pure­ly per­sua­sive (“please help us”), but it per­forms a moral-emo­tio­nal judg­ment that invites inter­na­li­sa­tion : “You are fai­ling us, your com­mu­ni­ty, unless you feel what we want you to feel.” In this sense, that emo­tives express and reshape emo­tio­nal expe­rience by rea­li­gning the nar­ra­tive sense of one­self and the expec­ted moral posi­tion of the community.

The same ana­ly­sis applies to Macrons “war”. The expres­sion declares a col­lec­tive cri­sis state, it evokes gra­vi­ty, calls out a clear and present dan­ger and warns about an exis­ten­tial threat. Thus, it ins­talls an emo­tio­nal cli­mate of war­time uni­ty, emer­gen­cy dis­ci­pline, and patrio­tic mobi­li­sa­tion. Unlike the English moral com­mu­ni­ty, French citi­zens are sum­mo­ned in the guise of sol­diers and patriots, enlis­ted in the defence of the state.

The Ger­man example seems poli­ti­cal­ly the most unset­tling. The consul­tants empha­sise hor­ri­fic ima­ge­ry (death by suf­fo­ca­tion) in order to induce “pri­mal fears” and uncon­trol­lable panic. They ins­tru­men­ta­lise guilt in chil­dren to heigh­ten fami­ly res­pon­si­bi­li­ty by evo­king a night­ma­rish par­ri­cide that results from disobeying.

-Germany’s res­ponse cor­res­ponds in func­tion (if not in scale) to Jaco­bin emo­tio­nal regimes ana­ly­sed by Red­dy in the per­iod of French Ter­ror (Sep­tem­ber 1793 – July 1794). Emo­tio­nal authen­ti­ci­ty is mea­su­red by confor­mi­ty to the col­lec­tive fear. In the context of post-Revo­lu­tio­na­ry France, not fea­ring enough becomes a sign of coun­ter-revo­lu­tio­na­ry dis­loyal­ty. Simi­lar­ly, in 2020 Ger­ma­ny, not appea­ring afraid (or ques­tio­ning the panic nar­ra­tive) could make one sus­pec­ted of being reck­less, not acting in soli­da­ri­ty, or worse, of being a right-wing-extre­mist-ene­my of the state.

To push things even fur­ther, Germany’s fede­ral domes­tic intel­li­gence ser­vice – the Fede­ral Office for the Pro­tec­tion of the Consti­tu­tion – esta­bli­shed, in 2021, a new ‘phe­no­me­non area’ for ver­bal “dele­gi­ti­mi­sa­tion of the state” as part of a broa­der affec­tive dis­ci­pli­ning. Much like the East Ger­man state’s atten­tion to emo­tio­nal atti­tudes and moral tone (Brauer, 2011), pan­de­mic-era Ger­ma­ny began to police not only what people did or said, but how they felt, or more pre­ci­se­ly, which emo­tions they were publi­cly per­mit­ted to express. The result, in Reddy’s terms, was the emer­gence of a strict emo­tio­nal regime, whe­rein fear, trust, and com­pliance became not just encou­ra­ged but expec­ted, while scep­ti­cism, defiance, and even calm detach­ment were mar­ked as dan­ge­rous devia­tions from nor­ma­tive feeling.

The Touched and the Untouchable

As Red­dy shows, emo­tives do not exist in iso­la­tion but ope­rate within broa­der emo­tio­nal styles that can trans­form into hege­mo­nic “emo­tio­nal regimes”. These regimes then consti­tute the offi­cial­ly sanc­tio­ned or domi­nant norms gover­ning which emo­tions are dee­med appro­priate or requi­red. An emo­tio­nal regime may be concep­tua­li­sed as the emo­tio­nal dimen­sion of a culture’s ideo­lo­gi­cal structure.

This pers­pec­tive helps explain how dis­tinct emo­tio­nal regimes were deli­be­ra­te­ly construc­ted within varying natio­nal and cultu­ral set­tings. The aim was to culti­vate spe­ci­fic emo­tio­nal land­scapes which, accor­ding to poli­ti­cal figures, scien­ti­fic experts and media out­lets were per­cei­ved as the most effec­tive means to encou­rage, per­suade, or even com­pel popu­la­tions towards the desi­red atti­tudes and beha­viours. This was to be achie­ved, in large part, by ali­gning public sen­ti­ment with state goals and fra­ming non-com­pliance as moral­ly reprehensible.

By dic­ta­ting appro­priate fee­lings such as patrio­tism, calm obe­dience, com­pliance, soli­da­ri­ty, anxie­ty or even panic, while dis­cou­ra­ging dissent, cri­tique, lack of fear or apa­thy, the Covid res­ponses ins­tal­led what Red­dy calls a “strict” emo­tio­nal regime. In strict regimes – as was the case in most Wes­tern demo­cra­cies – autho­ri­ties hea­vi­ly dic­tate emo­tio­nal res­ponses (e.g. deman­ding constant dis­plays of patrio­tic fear or fer­vour), whe­reas a “loo­ser” regimes (like Swe­den) allo­wed more indi­vi­dual emo­tio­nal freedom.

The construc­tion of a strict emo­tio­nal regime evi­dent­ly leaves lit­tle room for indi­vi­dual “emo­tio­nal navi­ga­tion”. Emo­tio­nal navi­ga­tion, in Reddy’s theo­ry, is the pro­cess through which indi­vi­duals explore and reo­rient their fee­lings, often by attemp­ting to name or express them using avai­lable emo­tio­nal des­crip­tions. Hence, within strict regimes, the man­da­ted emo­tions and sup­pres­sion of others are always at risk of crea­ting a conflict with indi­vi­duals’ authen­tic fee­lings. Pres­sure to conform reduces our auto­no­my to explore and arti­cu­late genuine emo­tio­nal experiences.

Reddy’s work sug­gests that strict regimes inevi­ta­bly inflict “psy­cho­lo­gi­cal pains”. This psy­cho­lo­gi­cal pain arises from the dis­cre­pan­cy bet­ween one’s inter­nal emo­tio­nal state and the exter­nal expec­ta­tion of how one should feel or express emo­tions. The deli­be­rate heigh­te­ning of threat and wea­po­ni­sa­tion of fear, as seen in the afo­re­men­tio­ned pan­de­mic poli­cies, lead to signi­fi­cant emo­tio­nal suffering.

This approach mir­rors what the Ger­man memo pro­po­sed (making indi­vi­duals, even chil­dren, feel accoun­table for tra­gic out­comes) and what SPI‑B had cal­led “shame” by confla­ting com­pliance with vir­tue and non-com­pliance with deviance (All-Par­ty Par­lia­men­ta­ry Groups, 2022).

Indeed, psy­cho­lo­gists repor­ted a rise in what they dub­bed “COVID-19 Anxie­ty Syn­drome,” where indi­vi­duals became obses­si­ve­ly fear­ful (avoi­ding public spaces, constant symp­tom-che­cking, etc.), effec­ti­ve­ly locked into a state of chro­nic anxie­ty (All-Par­ty Par­lia­men­ta­ry Groups, 2022). Pro­fes­sor of psy­cho­lo­gy Mar­can­to­nio Spa­da, who stu­died this phe­no­me­non, war­ned that by “deli­be­ra­te­ly inflat[ing]the threat and per­cei­ved fear of Covid-19 (in com­bi­na­tion with lock­downs)”, the govern­ment made it like­ly “that a signi­fi­cant pro­por­tion of the popu­la­tion would deve­lop psy­cho­pa­tho­lo­gi­cal res­ponses and end up locked into their fear or deve­lop rela­ted forms of anxie­ty such as health anxie­ty and obses­sive-com­pul­sive beha­viours” (All-Par­ty Par­lia­men­ta­ry Groups, 2022).

As a conse­quence, when people find an emo­tio­nal regime oppres­sive or alie­na­ting, they seek “emo­tio­nal refuges”, that is, social spaces or sub­cul­tures that per­mit the free expres­sion of for­bid­den fee­lings. These refuges (such as the his­to­ric salons, Maso­nic lodges, cafés in Reddy’s research) let indi­vi­duals “breathe” emo­tio­nal­ly and share sen­ti­ments that the domi­nant dis­course suppresses.

In the context of the Covid-19 pan­de­mic, social media plat­forms played a cru­cial role as digi­tal emo­tio­nal refuges, allo­wing indi­vi­duals to arti­cu­late forms of scep­ti­cism, frus­tra­tion, iro­ny, or grief that were often unwel­come or dele­gi­ti­mi­sed in mains­tream public dis­course. Whe­ther through Tele­gram groups, Face­book forums, You­Tube com­ments, or encryp­ted chat chan­nels, these online spaces became vital are­nas not only for a dele­gi­ti­mi­zed cri­tique, but also for affec­tive expres­sion, espe­cial­ly for those who rejec­ted the emo­tio­nal scripts of fear, com­pliance, or trust in govern­ment authority.

Here, alter­na­tive emo­tio­nal nar­ra­tives could cir­cu­late : defiance against confi­ne­ment, sar­casm toward offi­cial slo­gans, or empa­thy with mar­gi­na­li­sed voices such as vac­cine scep­tics, small busi­ness owners, or dis­tres­sed ado­les­cents. It was these spaces that func­tio­ned as emo­tio­nal coun­ter-publics : infor­mal com­mu­ni­ties where dis­so­nant emo­tions could be sha­red, vali­da­ted, and ampli­fied out­side the nor­ma­tive emo­tio­nal regime that attemp­ted to mono­po­lise the emo­tio­nal field.

Yet even these emo­tio­nal coun­ter-publics did not remain untou­ched. As expres­sions of dissent or ambi­va­lence became increa­sin­gly vili­fied and patho­lo­gi­sed, many of these refuges were them­selves sub­jec­ted to forms of sur­veillance, content mode­ra­tion, public denun­cia­tion and cen­sor­ship. Social media plat­forms inten­si­fied their control of dis­course through algo­rith­mic fil­te­ring and deplat­for­ming, while govern­ments and media denoun­ced cer­tain emo­tio­nal expres­sions, espe­cial­ly those cri­ti­cal of offi­cial poli­cy, as irra­tio­nal, dan­ge­rous, or poli­ti­cal­ly sub­ver­sive. In this way, the emo­tio­nal regime exten­ded its reach, constrai­ning the very spaces where alter­na­tive affec­tive orien­ta­tions could emerge, inten­si­fying emo­tio­nal suf­fe­ring and nar­ro­wing the hori­zon of legi­ti­mate emo­tio­nal life.

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